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The Scale-Efficiency version of the Efficient-Structure Hypothesis and the Structure-
Conduct-Performance Hypothesis find empirical support in German banking data from 1998 
to 2002. Due to the acceptance of the two hypotheses and the existence of overall economies 
of scale, we conclude that German banks may improve their profitability by increasing their 
asset size and/or by consolidation. The increased banking profitability will not only come 
from monopolistic power (higher concentration rate) but also from the scale efficiency benefit. 
We also find that portfolio risk is a key factor in determining the profit-structure relationship.  
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1. Introduction 
In a recent paper published by the IMF, Decressin et al. (2003) propose that recent weak bank 
profitability in Germany appears to be related with structural factors rather than the macro-
economic cycle. Some anecdotal evidence and financial ratio analyses are also presented to 
support this claim. The motivation of this paper is to study the issue of bank profitability in a 
coherent and rigorous econometric framework with a large panel data set of the German bank-
ing industry. Another main motivation is to go beyond the factors explored in the IMF paper 
in explaining why the profitability of the German banking system has been relatively low and 
trended downwards over recent years. For example, over 20 percent of Germany’s commer-
cial banks in the Fitch IBCA database did not earn a rate of return for their owners that ex-
ceeded the rate of a risk-free treasury bill3. This immediately leads to the question of how the 
structure and the organization of the German banking system can be changed to safeguard 
banks’ profitability and the sector’s stability. 
First, we would like to give a brief overview of the German banking system. As shown in Ta-
ble 1 below, the German banking system is composed of the three following pillars: commer-
cial banks, cooperatives, and public sector banks4. 
 
[Please insert Table 1] 
 
These three pillars are all different with respect to ownership and objectives. For example, 
most of the public sector banks are effectively owned by state and local governments, which 
operate commercially but also have a public mandate and currently benefit from a govern-
ment guarantee. The group of public sector banks comprises regional and national develop-
ment banks, savings banks (Sparkassen), and their state banks (Landesbanken). Since these 
public sector banks are governed by public law, the mandate of the savings banks (Sparkassen) 
and state banks (Landesbanken) is to foster the economic development of their regions by fol-
lowing viable business plans. Moreover, public sector banks enjoy the benefits of state guar-
antees5 which ensure that public sector banks are able to meet their obligations at any time. 
Because of these guarantees, public sector banks have the advantage of access to lower-cost 
funds relative to their lower-rated competitors. Although now the public sector guarantees are 
 
3
 Decressin et al. (2003) find that this is the case in any of the three years 1997, 1999, and 2001. Another indi-
cator from the OECD suggests that Germany’s banking system pre-tax ROA reached about 1/4 percent in 
2000-2001, having declined noticeably in the 1990s. 
4 In addition, mortgage banks and building and loan societies (Realkreditinstitute and Bausparkassen) operate 
in all three sectors. Moreover, the continued operation of the state banks (Landesbanken) is guaranteed by the 
saving banks (Sparkassen) through the institutional protection scheme. 
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being phased out6, the removal of state guarantees does not mean that there will be no public 
support for public sector banks. Particularly the state banks (Landesbanken) are considered 
too big to fail7. Moreover, the phase-out of the guarantees will only have a limited impact on 
the savings banks (Sparkassen), because only few savings banks (Sparkassen) raise funds in 
capital markets. Savings banks (Sparkassen) predominantly rely on customer deposits and in-
terbank loans for the bulk of their funding needs8. 
The second group in the German banking industry is the cooperatives (Volksbanken, Raiff-
eisenbanken, Spar- and Darlehenskassen). This group of banks was founded as self-help or-
ganizations for craftsmen, workers and farmers. Cooperative banks concentrate on their re-
spective local markets and do not compete with one another9. Since cooperatives concentrate 
on a specific local clientele, this group of banks have an informational advantage in evaluat-
ing the creditworthiness of their local borrowers, and the fact that depositors and borrowers 
are also mostly owners can reduce moral hazard. However, the disadvantage of this owner-
ship structure and customer base has limited diversification in the cooperative banks’ loan 
portfolios. 
Finally, the major part of private sector banks are commercial banks. Commercial banks 
comprise the big four banks, which account for roughly two thirds of this sector’s business. 
The private sector banks also include the Postbank10, foreign banks, and numerous smaller 
banks. The biggest four commercial banks comprise Deutsche Bank, HypoVereinsbank, 
Dresdner Bank, and Commerzbank. Like the cooperative banks, they do not benefit from a 
public sector guarantee, and thus are at a disadvantage relative to the state banks (Landes-
banken) in tapping capital markets. Also, the commercial banks run a generous voluntary de-
posit protection scheme instead of an institution protection scheme. This generous voluntary 
deposit protection scheme is administered by the commercial bankers’ association to enable 
competition with public banks and cooperatives in deposit-taking. Moreover, commercial 
banks (including those that do not elect to be members of the voluntary deposit guarantee 
scheme) have to participate in the less generous statutory deposit protection scheme. Neglect-
 
6
 On July 18, 2001, the European Commission and the German authorities came to an agreement to abolish the 
public sector guarantees for the savings banks (Sparkassen) and state banks (Landesbanken). The termination 
of government guarantees for public sector banks will start in mid-2005  
7
 Another reason is that the savings banks (Sparkassen) will still have to stand behind the state banks (Landes-
banken),  because of their institutional protection scheme. 
8
 The situation for the state banks (Landesbanken) is different, since nearly one third of their liabilities take the 
form of securities. Because of state guarantee, state banks (Landesbanken) can have better rating from the 
rating companies. 
9
 Although some used to focus on certain groups of the population, they are now offering services to everyone 
across the country. 
10
 The Postbank, which ranks among the country’s postal service, is a joint stock corporation under private law 
that. The majority of Postbank shares is still held by the Federal Republic of Germany.  
 3
 
ing the different ownership structure, co-operations and public banks exhibit a quite similar 
behavior. 
Generally speaking, from the Fitch IBCA database, we can observe that savings banks (Spar-
kassen) and cooperatives currently have higher returns on equity than commercial banks. 
After reviewing the German banking system, we come back to the argument of how struc-
tural factors affect German banking profitability. Many propose that the relatively low profit-
ability of the German banking system could possibly reflect that profit maximization is not 
always the paramount objective of public sector banks and cooperatives. Furthermore, a high 
number of banks per capita leads to intense competition. For instance, Decressin et al. (2003) 
point out that competition in Germany appears to be more intense than in the United Kingdom 
and France. In the following part, we will attempt to find out how the market structure affects 
banks’ profitability by examining a model that can distinguish between three competing 
profit-structure hypotheses. 
Three profit-structure hypotheses have emerged in the banking literature to explain the profit-
structure relationship. They are the Structure-Conduct-Performance Hypothesis, the Relative-
Market-Power Hypothesis, and the Scale-Efficiency version of the Efficient-Structure Hy-
pothesis. The Structure-Conduct-Performance Hypothesis states that banks set prices that are 
less favorable to consumers in more concentrated markets because of an imperfect competi-
tion. The Relative-Market-Power Hypothesis suggests that only banks with large market 
shares and well-differentiated products can exercise market power in pricing these products 
and earn supernormal profits (Shepherd, 1982). Finally, under the Scale-Efficiency version of 
the Efficient-Structure Hypothesis, all banks have equally good management and technology 
(the same X-efficiency), but some banks simply produce at more efficient scales than others. 
Under the scale efficiency version of the Efficient-Structure Hypothesis, since these banks 
which locate on more efficient scale are also assumed to gain large market shares that may re-
sult in high concentration, the positive profit-structure relationship is spurious (Lambson, 
1987). 
In addition to market structure and scale efficiency, we also consider risk-taking as determi-
nant of banks’ profitability. The management of risks has recently been identified as a main 
rationale for industry consolidation. For instance, Benston, Hunter and Wall (1995) point out 
that banks mergers and acquisitions may be motivated by a desire to obtain the risk-reducing 
effects of diversification. Acharva, Hasan and Saunders (2002) find empirical support that 
geographical diversification results in an improvement in the risk-return tradeoff for banks 
with low levels of risk. In this study, our consideration is that the risk-taking behavior of fi-
nancial institutions has in recent years come to the forefront of the debate on the stability of 
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the banking system (Edwards and Mishkin, 1995)11. Our measurement of risk is based on the 
theory of the trade-off relationship between risks and profits. Koch and MacDonald (2003) 
show that for banks higher returns are generally indicative of above average risks, while 
lower returns should indicate a lower risk position. At the end of this paper we will discuss 
the relationship of the profit-structure relationship and risk-taking in greater detail. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the functional form 
and measurement methodologies adopted in this study. Section 3 contains the data description 
and sources. The following section shows the estimation and results. In a final section, we 
summarize our findings and give suggestions for the future industrial organization of the 
German banking sector. 
 
2. Specifications of Models 
2.1 Methodology: Scale Economies and the Profit-Structure Relationship 
Most previous contributions to the banking literature have tested the profit-structure hypothe-
ses alone by examining the price-concentration relationship without the benefit of efficiency. 
However, a potential drawback is present because the excluded efficiency variables may be 
correlated with both prices and market structure. For example, if an efficient bank has lower 
marginal cost (since this bank locates on the scale efficiency region of the average cost curve), 
this bank is usually bigger and has larger market share. In such cases, findings will incorrectly 
support the Structure-Conduct-Performance Hypothesis and the Market-Power Hypothesis. 
To argue with this point, we modify a model specification from Berger (1995) that nests the 
three profit-structure hypotheses, including a direct measure of scale efficiency and risk fac-
tors. In the following part, we first obtain scale efficiency by estimating the translog cost 
function. 
Scale Economies 
Banks’ multi-outputs in this paper are measured by the intermediation approach. In our view, 
the nature of banks is more accurately described as intermediaries of financial services rather 
than producers of loan and deposit account services, a view taken by the production ap-
proach12. We assume that domestic banks in Germany aim to minimize costs with profit-
maximizing behavior. The translog cost function has the form below: 
 
11
 Edwards and Mishkin (1995) argue that the erosion of profits due to competition from financial markets can 
be held responsible for the excessive risk-taking observed in the 1980s in the US. 
 
12
 The production approach usually defines banks’ output as the number of deposit of loan accounts or on the 
number of transactions performed on these accounts. 
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ln TC the natural logarithm of the total costs for interest costs, labour cost and  
 capital cost, 
Qi i-th output, 
Q1 total loans which include all class of loans, 
Q2 interbank assets, 
Q3 equity investments, 
Q4 other investments including liquidity investments and other investments, 
Pi i-th input prices, 
P1 interest rate = ( interest paid / interest-baring total deposits), 
P2 labor expense = (overheads expense / total output), 
P3 capital price = (operating cost / fixed assets), 
ln B the natural logarithm of the number of branches, 
α, β, γ, δ, λ, ρ, τ, h, k coefficients to be estimated. 
According to Shephard's Lemma (Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau, 1973), the derived demand 
for an input can be inferred by partially differentiating the cost function with respect to the in-

































i uthBQPs τργβ . (2) 
Since the duality theorem requires the cost function to be linearly homogeneous in input 
































Further, the second order parameters of the translog cost function (1) must satisfy the symme-
try condition. 
jiij δδ =    and      for all i, j. (4) jiij γγ =
The translog cost function (1) is estimated jointly with the cost share equation (2) using the 
seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) technique. Since the input cost share equa-
tions will sum to unity, one cost share equation should be omitted from the estimated system 
of equations to avoid the problem of a singular contemporary covariance matrix of distur-
bances (Berndt, Hall and Hansman, 1974). 
The concept of scale economies is based on the shape of the average cost curve. For instance, 
economies of scale are present up to the level where the long-run marginal cost (LMC) curve 
lies below the long-run average cost (LAC) curve. By following Molyneux et al. (1997) and 
Noulas et al. (1990), we estimate overall economies of scale for each bank by evaluating 









TCOES  (5) 
If OES < 1, there are increasing returns to scale, i.e. economies of scale exist. If OES = 1, 
constant returns to scale exist. If OES > 1, there are decreasing returns to scale. The existence 
of scale economies means that the average cost of producing a product, in the long run, de-
creases as more of the output is produced. 
 
The Profit-Structure Relationship 
The relationship between market structure and the profitability of banks is of concern to bank 
managers and to banking regulators. Particularly, the banking regulators have to weigh the 
potentially beneficial effects of mergers on the combined banks’ profitability and viability 
against the possible detrimental impact on consumer welfare. For example, increased compe-
tition from financial deregulation in the banking sector may force banks to invest into higher 
yielding assets by increasing their risk exposure beyond a reasonable level. Based on this con-
sideration, we will pay particular attention to the delicate balance between profitability and 
risk. We incorporate aspects of banks’ ex-post risk-taking behavior into a framework devel-
oped by Berger (1995) to evaluate alternative theories of the profit-structure relationship. Our 




Return on Equity (or Return on Assets) 
ROE (or ROA) = f1 (concentration rate, market share, scale efficiency, (6) 
 portfolio risk) + ε, 
Concentration rate 
CONC = f2 (scale efficiency) + ε, (7) 
Market share 
MS = f3 (scale efficiency) + ε. (8) 
All three hypotheses, the Structure-Conduct-Performance Hypothesis, the Market-Power Hy-
pothesis and the Scale-Efficiency version of Efficient-Structure Hypothesis, are represented 
by different variables. The major equation (6) is shown to be a valid reduced form for all of 
the hypotheses and any or all of them may be found to be consistent with the data. For in-
stance, if the Structure-Conduct-Performance Hypothesis holds, the coefficient of concentra-
tion is significant and positive, but the coefficient of market share is not in this case. This re-
sult indicates that the positive profit-concentration relationship occurs because concentration 
affects price and price affects profit. On the other hand, if the coefficient of market share is 
positive and significant, but the other coefficients are not, the Relative-Market-Power Hy-
pothesis holds. Under the Relative-Market-Power Hypothesis, market share becomes the key 
exogenous variable since banks with large market shares have well-differentiated products 
and are able to exercise market power in pricing these products.  
By contrast, if the Scale-Efficiency version of Efficient-Structure Hypothesis is accepted, the 
coefficient of the scale efficiency variable will be positive and significant. An important limi-
tation of the reduced-form profit equation in (6) is that it tests only one of the three necessary 
conditions of the Efficient-Structure hypotheses. In order to explain the profit-structure rela-
tionship spuriously, two more conditions (eq. 7 and eq. 8) should be met, since both profits 
and the market structure variables (concentration rate and market share) must be positively re-
lated to the variable of scale efficiency. For instance, equation (8) means that more efficient 
firms have greater market shares. This can be explained by the fact that more efficient banks 
obtain greater market share through price competition or through acquisition of less efficient 
banks.  
Finally, because of the assumed trade-off relationship between risks and returns, the impact of 
the risk factors on the profit-structure relationship will be studied by incorporating portfolio 
risk. In this study, our portfolio risk is measured by earnings variability which is the same 
method as used by Kwan (2004). Modern Portfolio Theory can be applied to banks, which 
hold different portfolios of assets by time. For example, banks can obtain a combination of 
risk and return that is better than can be obtained by holding assets that have a high positive 
correlation.  
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3. Data Description and Sources 
3.1 The Data Resources 
The data resources were individual banks’ balance sheets and income statements obtained 
from the Fitch IBCA database from 1998 to 2002. The data on branch numbers for German 
banks were gathered from Deutsche Bundesbank’s “Verzeichnis der Kreditinstitute”. Our 
sample includes the 288 biggest German banks (by asset size), which represent at least 90% 
of the total loan market in Germany. The sample banks are listed in Appendix 1. Given the 
chosen intermediation approach, we use four categories of outputs, three kinds of input vari-
ables and one control variable in our models. All variables in this study are measured in Euro 
million dollars. Data from income statements are gathered from 1st of January to 31st of De-
cember for each year. Data from balance sheets and the other official reports are obtained on 
31st of December for each year. All variables in this paper are defined in the following section. 
 
3.2 Definitions of Variables 
Profitability (ROE or ROA) 
In this study, we employ the pre-tax return on equity and the pre-tax return on total assets as 
our two profitability indicators. The rate of return on equity is the most appropriate measure 
of profitability as it is more consistent with the notion that ownership will seek to maximize 
profits. However, to eliminate the financial leverage effect, we also use the rate of return on 
total assets as an alternative.  
 
Market share (MS) and Concentration (CONC) variables 
We measure the degree of concentration in the banking sector by using the size of bank loans, 
and rely upon the Herfindahl index (HERF) for our econometric analysis. The Herfindahl in-


















TDi  bank i ’s total loans 
TD  all sample banks’ total loans. 
                                                 
13
 When an industry is occupied by only one firm (a pure monopolist), the index attains its maximum value of 
1.0. The value declines with increases in the number of firms N and increases with rising inequality among 
any given number of firms. By squaring market shares, the HERF index weights more heavily the values for 
large firms than for small. 
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The following Table describes the change of loan market share for the major groups of Ger-
man banks, and Herfindahl index of market concentration of the German industry from 1998-
2001. 
 
[Please insert Table 2] 
 
Not only that Germany has much higher number of banks than France, Italy and Spain14, but 
also we can observe from Table 1 that concentration rate in Germany is also much lower than 
the concentration rate in the US, which is around 20 % (Berger, 1995). Moreover, the extent 
of consolidation in Germany is lower than that in the global banking industry (Balino et al., 
2000; Belaish et al., 2001). However, the concentration rate in Germany has still slightly de-
creased over time.  
 
Scale efficiency:  S-EFFe  and  S-EFFd 
We obtain scale efficiencies from the major translog cost function in the previous case of 
scale economies. For each bank’s output mix and input prices, a U-shaped multi-product av-
erage cost curve is traced out and the scale-efficient output vector Yse at the bottom of the U-
curve can also be determined. We distinguish between scale economy efficiency for banks that 
are below efficient scale, and scale diseconomy efficiency for banks that are above efficient 
scale. 
Thus, we include the scale economy efficiency (S-EFFe) variable and the scale diseconomies 
efficiency (S-EFFd) variable to replace the scale efficiency (S-EFF) variable, because they 
may have different implications under the Scale-Efficiency version of the Efficient-Structure 
Hypothesis. Advocates of the Scale-Efficiency version of the Efficient-Structure Hypothesis 
argue that banks in the scale economy region grow larger and more profitable and at the same 
time increase their market share and their market’s concentration rate rises, creating the spuri-
ous positive profit-structure relationship. In contrast, banks in the scale diseconomy region 
shrink to increase scale efficiency and profits. If dominant firms shrink, it would reduce the 
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1 , (10) 
                                                 
14
 The data source is OECD Bank Profitability (2002). In 2001, Germany had 2,370 banks, while France, Italy, 
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Indicator of portfolio risk 
In Kwan’s (2004) study about risk and returns of publicly held versus privately owned banks, 
risk is measured by loan portfolio quality or earnings variability. The author finds that the re-
sults for the two measurements are statistically indistinguishable. Because of data availability, 
we use a simple measure of banks’ portfolio risk to shed light on the risk-return tradeoff rela-
tionship and our portfolio risk is defined as earnings variability.  
In our study, portfolio risk for the k-th period is obtained from the standard error of return of 
asset for k, k–1, and k–2 period. In portfolio theory, portfolio risk is usually defined as the 
standard deviation of the probability distribution of asset returns. 
 
Finally, we summarize the definitions and statistics of all variables in the following Table 3 
and Appendix 2. 
 
[Please insert Table 3] 
 
4. Estimation and Results 
Different from most of previous studies, we use a panel data set instead of single year data to 
investigate scale economies and the profit-structure relationship of the German banking in-
dustry. Although positive serial correlation and heteroscedasticity will still exist, using panel 
data enables us to investigate the relationships between temporal changes and cross-sectional 
differences. We employ the seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) technique, 
which is particularly useful with large panel data sets (Avery, 1977) to estimate several equa-
tions simultaneously. In this specific error components model, the regression errors in each 
equation are assumed to be composed of three independent components – one component as-
sociated with time, another with cross-sectional units, and a third with each observation. 
jntjtjnjnt ενµu ++=  (12) 
The model developed above makes the assumptions that both within and between equation er-
ror covariances are composed of independent individual, time period, and observation com-




                                                
koohi (1996) and Hunter and Timme (1986) also use seemingly unrelated regression estima-
tion (SURE) to analyze the panel data for the translog cost function system of banks. 
 
4.1 Results of the scale economies 
Since we will include the direct measure of scale economies in the specification model of the 
profit-structure relationship model, we summarize all empirical results from our translog cost 
function system here. 
 
Translog Cost Function System 
From the following Table 4, we find that the coefficient of branch number (B) is positive and 
significant. According to the coefficients of all outputs, we may infer that, producing one 
more unit of interbank assets (Q2) will cost German banks much more than producing the 
other three outputs: total loans (Q1), equity investment (Q3) and other investments (Q4). Since 
the coefficient of time (t) is significantly negative, this may imply that technology (e.g. com-
puter, software of exchange system, information system and so on) has helped German banks 
to reduce their total costs over time. 
 
[Please insert Table 4] 
 
Overall Economies of Scale  
We obtain an average value of overall economies of scale for the German banking industry of 
0.5812 (refer to Table 5). This empirical result means that from a cost standpoint, German 
banks can obtain the benefit from overall economies of scale by increasing their bank asset 
size. This conclusion is the same as the results from studies cited in the literature review of 
Molyneux et al. (1997), although the value is smaller15. However, this difference can be ex-
plained by the choice of a completely different data set, sample period, number of outputs and 
definitions of outputs and inputs16. For example, based on the choice of our sample set, there 
is a wide range of asset sizes within the 298 biggest German banks and until the 298th banks, 




 For example, the average value of overall economies of scale from Molyneux et al. (1997) is 0.70. 
16
 For example, our labour cost is defined as overheads expense / total outputs. Molyneux et al. (1997) define 




[Please insert Table 5] 
 
Furthermore, we make use of separate samples to provide us with a comprehensive treatment 
of the banking industry and determine whether the results are stable across environments. 
From Table 5, we can see the average values of overall economies of scale of public sector 
banks, private sector banks and cooperative sector banks are 0.5493, 0.7484 and 0.5741 re-
spectively. The values of overall economies of scale are all significantly different from one 
and our results show that all three groups are all able to obtain the benefit from overall 
economies of scale. 
 
4.2 Results for the Profit-Structure Relationship 
In this section, we investigate the three profit-structure hypotheses as competing explanations 
of the observed variation in bank profitability. Our specification model includes the equations 
(6), (7) and (8) where return on equity/ return on assets are used as profitability indicators. In 
contrast to previous banking studies, we add portfolio risk into major equation (6). We note 
that the adjusted R2 of the major equation (6) is considerably raised from 3.56% to 33.08%. 
(Please refer to Table 6 and Appendix 3.)  Since the previous banking literature have obtained 
adjusted R2 for the major equation ranging from 3% to 21% (Berger, 1995) without consider-
ing portfolio risk in the profit-structure relationship, our empirical evidence may support the 
notion that portfolio risk plays an important role in determining German banking profitability.  
 
[Please insert Table 6] 
 
After we add portfolio risk into the major equation (6), the market share coefficient in the ma-
jor equation (6) is still negative and significant at the 10 % critical level which, again, sug-
gests that the Relative-Market-Power Hypothesis is rejected. However, we have several new 
findings. First, the coefficient of the concentration rate is positively related to return on equity 
and becomes significant at the 5% critical level in the major equation (6). This result means 
that there is a positive profit-structure relationship in the German banking industry. The im-
plication is that German banks could achieve a higher profitability (return on equity) if the 
German banking market was more concentrated. However, the drawbacks of such a hypothe-
sis should not be neglected. Banking regulators also need to pay attention to protect consum-
ers’ benefit, because the acceptance of the Structure-Conduct-Performance Hypothesis indi-
cates that adverse effects of higher concentration on consumer welfare are likely. The Struc-
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ture-Conduct-Performance Hypothesis states that banks can set prices that are less favorable 
to consumers in more concentrated markets because of competitive imperfections. 
Since the coefficients of scale efficiency are all positive in equations (6), (7), and (8), the 
Scale-Efficiency version of Efficient-Structure Hypothesis is still significant after portfolio 
risk is added. Higher profitability is thus not only derived from monopoly power (a higher 
concentration rate) but also from the greater scale efficiency. The accepted Scale-Efficiency 
version of Efficient-Structure Hypothesis shows that German banks can improve their bank-
ing profitability by increasing their asset size. In addition, banks would obtain the benefit 
from scale efficiency by bank mergers or by opening more bank branches.  
One more new result is that the coefficient of portfolio risk is significant at the 1% critical 
level and has the “right” (positive) sign. Lower returns indicate a lower risk position, while 
high returns are generally indicative of higher average risk. Thus, we can say if a German 
bank is very conservative and exhibits low ex-post portfolio risk; its profit may be negatively 
affected. However, portfolio risk should be maintained within in a certain level to assure 
banks’ safety. Furthermore, if we use return on asset as our profitability indicator instead of 
return on equity, our empirical results in table 7 are similar.  
 
[Please insert Table 7] 
 
Finally we summarize all empirical results on profit-structure relationships in the following 
Table:  
 
[Please insert Table 8] 
 
5. Conclusions 
To answer the questions posed in our introduction, the empirical evidence gathered in this pa-
per shows that market structure plays a significant role in determining German banks’ profit-
ability. Analysis on a panel of 288 German banks from 1998 to 2002 supports the Structure-
Conduct-Performance Hypothesis and the Scale-Efficiency version of the Efficient-Structure 
Hypothesis. Since the Structure-Conduct-Performance Hypothesis is accepted, we may con-
clude that a higher concentration rate is likely to bring about a positive effect on German 
banking industry profitability. However, German banking regulators also need to pay atten-
tion to protecting consumers’ benefit as further concentration may give banks the ability to set 
less favourable price for customers. Fortunately, due to the acceptance of the Scale-Efficiency 
version of Efficient-Structure Hypothesis and the existence of overall economies of scale, the 
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increased profitability after any consolidation will not only come from the monopolistic 
power (higher concentration rate) but also from greater scale efficiency.  
Another important finding in this paper is that portfolio risk is also a key factor in determining 
the profit-structure relationship. Incorporating portfolio risk can significantly increase the ad-
justed R2 of our specification model. This empirical result indicates that German banks could 
achieve a higher yield on their assets by taking appropriate portfolio risks. Certainly, appro-
priate risk management systems still need to be in place. If the latter is not the case and com-
petition becomes too intense, increased risk-taking by banks may even threaten the stability of 




Table 1: Overview of the German Banking System 
(1) Private-sector (non-cooperative) banks 
 • Commercial banks 
 • Private sector mortgage banks 
(2) Cooperative banks (Genossenschaftsbanken) 
 • Central institutions 
 • Credit cooperatives 
  (Volksbanken, Raiffeisenbanken, Spar- and Darlehenskassen) 
(3) All public sector credit institutions 
 • Savings banks (Sparkassen) 
 • State banks (Landesbanken) / Girozentralen 
 • Public sector mortgage banks  





Concentration Rate and Market Shares of the Different Groups of German Banks 





Sample Banks 0.0428 0.0359 0.0373 0.0354 0.0356 
Saving 
Banks Sparkassen 0.1384 0.1284 0.1060 0.1076 0.1078 
State Banks Landesbanken 0.1957 0.1773 0.1529 0.1580 0.1583 
Cooperative 
Banks Volksbanken 0.0314 0.0301 0.0597 0.0585 0.0587 
Market 





Banks 0.6105 0.6106 0.6347 0.6293 0.6296 
Source: Calculated by the authors and the data collected from the Fitch IBCA database. 
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Table 3: 
Definitions for All Variables in the Model of Profit-Structure Relationship 
Symbol Definitions 
ROA Ratio of net before-tax income to assets. 
ROE Ratio of net before-tax income to equity. 
CONC Herfindahl index of concentration of loan market  
MS Bank ’s share of total market loan. i
S-EFF Scale efficiency can be obtained from the previous case of scale economies.  
S-EFFe Scale economy efficiency: equals S-EFF if bank is below efficient scale; equals 1 otherwise. 
S-EFFd Scale diseconomies efficiency; equals S-EFF if bank is above efficient scale; equals 1 otherwise. 
Portfolio Risk The portfolio risk is defined as the standard error of the return of assets.  





Empirical Results of the Translog Cost Function System 
Coefficient 1998-2001 
Constant 4.9294 (5.6419) 
ln Q1 2.2493* (1.3106) 
ln Q2 5.9193*** (1.0551) 
ln Q3 2.9771*** (0.5443) 
ln Q4 2.2616*** (0.7793) 
ln P1 0.4128 (0.4703) 
ln P2 0.4080 (0.3643) 
ln B 6.0686*** (0.8442) 
(ln Q1)2 0.4812** (0.2320) 
(ln Q2)2 0.1766*** (0.0273) 
(ln Q3)2 −0.0341* (0.0193) 
(ln Q4)2 0.0415 (0.0278) 
ln Q1 · ln Q2 −0.4346*** (0.1385) 
ln Q1 · ln Q3 −0.0946 (0.0699) 
ln Q1 · ln Q4 0.2765*** (0.0934) 
ln Q2 · ln Q3 0.2724*** (0.0481) 
ln Q2 · ln Q4 −0.0684* (0.0371) 
ln Q3 · ln Q4 -0.0656*** (0.0145) 
ln P1 · ln P2 −0.2297*** (0.0308) 
ln P1 · ln P3 0.2114*** (0.0629) 
ln P2 · ln P3 0.1736*** (0.0484) 
(ln B)2 0.2300* (0.1310) 
ln P1 · ln Q1
 
0.4803*** (0.0706) 
ln P2 · ln Q1
 ln P1 · ln Q2 
0.3560*** (0.0547) 
0.2842*** (0.0443) 
ln P2 · ln Q2 0.2240*** (0.0341) 
ln P1 · ln Q3 0.4840*** (0.0165) 
ln P2 · ln Q3 0.3645*** (0.0130) 
ln P1 · ln Q4 0.4863*** (0.0224) 
ln P2 · ln Q4 0.3712*** (0.0174) 
ln B · ln Q1 −0.5149*** (0.1460) 
ln B · ln Q2 0.1623 (0.1035) 
ln B · ln Q3 0.0587* (0.0317) 
ln B · ln Q4 −0.2281*** (0.0647) 
ln B · ln P1 0.2946*** (0.0439) 
ln B · ln P2 0.2242*** (0.0343) 
ln P1 · t −3.7326*** (0.0751) 
ln P2 · t −2.8545*** (0.0578) 
ln P3 · t  
 ln Q1 · t 
−2.0249*** (0.1080) 
0.2129 (0.1540) 
ln Q2 · t
 
 −0.4298*** (0.0872) 
ln Q3 · t
 
 −0.0545 (0.0454) 
ln Q4 · t





t −29..5422*** (1.2680) 
t2 −0.0562 (0.1521) 
Private 1.3714***         (0.5115) 
Cooperative 1.8949***         (0.5298) 
Approximate standard error in parentheses; 
* significantly different from zero at 10% level; 
** significantly different from zero at 5% level; 




Empirical Results of Overall Economies of Scale for German Banks from 1998 to 2002 
Groups Composition of the Group Value of Overall Economies of Scale 
Public Sector Banks State Banks (Landesbanken), and Saving Banks (Sparkassen) 
0.5493*** 
(0.3627) 
Private Sector Banks Commercial Banks 0.7484*** (0.3951) 
Cooperative Sector Banks Credit Cooperatives 0.5741*** (0.4319) 
German Banking Industry Whole Sample Banks 0.5812*** (0.3774) 
Approximate standard error in parentheses; 
* significantly different from one at 10% level; 
** significantly different from one at 5% level; 




Empirical Results of the Profit-Structure Relationship with Cconsidering Portfolio Risk 
(ROE as Indicator of Profitability) 
Variable ROE (eq. 6) CONC (eq. 7) MS (eq. 8) 





Concentration Rate  122.6514** (45.5075)   









Portfolio Risk 20.4953*** (1.0959)   










Adjusted R2 33.08% 1.3% 7.43% 
Approximate standard error in parentheses; 
* significantly different from zero at 10% level; 
** significantly different from zero at 5% level; 




Empirical Results of the Profit-Structure Relationship with Considering Portfolio Risk 
(ROA as Indicator of Profitability) 
Variable ROA (eq. 6) CONC (eq. 7) MS (eq. 8) 





Concentration Rate  8.9761* (4.6920)   









Portfolio Risk 1.0062*** (0.0716)   










Adjusted R2 21.42% 1.3% 7.43% 
Approximate standard error in parentheses; 
* significantly different from zero at 10% level; 
** significantly different from zero at 5% level; 




Summary of Results of Three Profit-Structure Relationship Hypotheses 
Profitability Indicator ROE ROA 
Structure-Conduct-Performance 
Hypothesis Accepted Accepted 
Relative-Market-Power 
Hypothesis  Rejected Rejected 
Efficient-Structure Hypothesis 
under Scale-Efficiency Version Accepted Accepted 
Portfolio Risk Significant Significant 
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The Sample Banks in this Study: 288 German Banks 
1 Deutsche Bank AG 
2 Bayerische Hypo 
3 Commerzbank AG  
4 Dresdner Bank 
5 Bayerische Landesbank 
6 LBBW 
7 WestLB AG 
8 Nord/LB 
9 Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG 
10 Depfa Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG 
11 Landesbank Schleswig-Holstein 
12 Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen 
13 Deutsche Postbank AG 
14 Hamburgische Landesbank 
15 Dekabank Deutsche Girozentrale 
16 Landesbank Berlin 
17 AHBR Allgemeine Hypothekenbank Rheinboden 
18 HVB Real Estate Bank 
19 Hypothekenbank in Essen 
20 Landesbank Rheinland-Pfalz 
21 Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank 
22 RHEINHYP Rheinische Hypothekenbank AG 
23 DZ Bank AG-Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank 
24 Eurohypo Europäische Hypothekenbank der Deutschen Bank 
25 Deutsche Genossenschafts-Hypothekenbank 
26 Westdeutsche Genossenschafts-Zentralbank eG  
27 ING BHF-BANK AG  
28 Landesbank Sachsen Girozentrale 
29 Berlin-Hannoversche Hypothekenbank  
30 Westfälische Hypothekenbank AG  
31 Deutsche Bank Privat-und Geschäftsbank 
32 IKB Deutsche Industriebank 
33 Bremer Landesbank Kreditanstalt Oldenburg 
34 Bausparkasse Schwäbisch Hall AG 
35 SEB 
36 Dexia Hypothekenbank Berlin 
37 Münchener Hypothekenbank 
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38 Württembergische Hypothekenbank 
39 BHW Bausparkasse 
40 Baden-Württembergische Bank 
41 Deutsche Hypothekenbank 
42 Deutsche Kreditbank 
43 Deutsche Apotheker- und Arztebank 
44 Stadtsparkasse Köln 
45 Vereins-und Westbank 
46 Allgemeine Deutsche Direktbank 
47 WL-Bank - Westfälische Landschaft Bodenkreditbank 
48 SEB-Hypothekenbank 
49 Wüstenrot Bausparkasse 
50 Frankfurter Kasse 
51 Landesbank Saar-Saar 
52 Westdeutsche Immobilienbank 
53 Nassauische Sparkasse 
54 Kreissparkasse Köln 
55 Volkswagen Bank 
56 Stadtsparkasse München 
57 Maple Bank 
58 HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt KGaA 
59 Düsseldorfer Hypothekenbank 
60 Berliner Volksbank 
61 Die Sparkasse Bremen 
62 Schleswig-Holsteinische Landschaft Hypothekenbank  
63 Stadtsparkasse Düsseldorf 
64 Wüstenrot Hypothekenbank 
65 Sächsische Aufbaubank 
66 DVB Bank Deutsche Verkehrsbank AG 
67 Deutsche Schiffsbank 
68 Wüstenrot Bank 
69 Sparkasse Aach 
70 Debeka Bausparkasse 
71 LBS DeutscheWest 
72 Stadtsparkasse Hannover 
73 Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie. KGaA 
74 Oldenburgische Landesbank 
75 Sparkasse Nürnberg 
76 Bayerische Landesbausparkasse 
77 Sparkasse Münsterland 
78 Sparkasse Essen 
79 Kreissparkasse Ludwigsburg 
80 Kreissparkasse Esslingen-Nürtingen 
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81 LBS Baden-Württemberg 
82 Dresdner Bank Lateinamerika 
83 Sparda-Bank Südwest 
84 Landessparkasse zu Oldenburg 
85 CC Bank 
86 LBS Norddeutsche Landesbausparkasse Berlin-Hannover 
87 Kreissparkasse Heilbronn 
88 Sparkasse Leipzig 
89 Sparkasse Krefeld 
90 Sparkasse Pforzheim-Calw 
91 Kreissparkasse Waiblingen 
92 ABN Amro Bank (Deutschland) 
93 Sparkasse Dortmund 
94 Kreissparkasse Hannover 
95 Kreissparkasse München-Starnberg 
96 Sparkasse Mainfranken Würzburg 
97 Kreissparkasse Böblingen 
98 Lehman Brothers Bankhaus 
99 BBBank 
100 Sparkasse Bonn 
101 Entrium 
102 Sparkasse Bielefeld 
103 M.M. Warburg & Co. 
104 Mittelbrandenburgische Sparkasse 
105 Stadtsparkasse Dresden 
106 Kreissparkasse Göppingen 
107 Citigroup Global Markets Deutschland 
108 GEFA 
109 Kölner Bank 
110 Sparda-Bank Baden-Württemberg 
111 Sparkasse Bochum 
112 Sparkasse Neuß 
113 VR-Leasing AG 
114 Sparkasse Osnabrück 
115 GMAC Bank GmbH 
116 Deutsche Bausparkasse BADENIA 
117 Kreissparkasse in Siegburg 
118 Frankfurter Volksbank 
119 Stadtsparkasse Duisburg 
120 Hamburgische Wohnungsbaukreditanstalt 
121 BMW Bank 
122 Sparkasse Saarbrücken 
123 Kasseler Sparkasse 
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124 Sparkasse Karlsruhe 
125 Weberbank Privatbankiers 
126 Evangelische Darlehensgenossenschaft 
127 Sparkasse Herford 
128 Schmidtbank 
129 Sparkasse Freiburg-Nordlicher Breisgau 
130 Stadtsparkasse Wuppertal 
131 Kreissparkasse Biberach 
132 Sparkasse Ulm 
133 Stadtsparkasse Augsburg 
134 Sparkasse Heidelberg 
135 Kreissparkasse Tübingen 
136 Sparkasse Koblenz 
137 Sparkasse Rhein-Neckar Nord 
138 Sparda-Bank Berlin 
139 Deutsche Bank Bausparkasse 
140 Taunus Sparkasse 
141 Sparkasse Fürstenfeldbruck 
142 Sparkasse Düren 
143 Kreissparkasse Ostalb 
144 Sparkasse Langen-Seligenstadt 
145 Sparkasse Hanau 
146 Sparkasse Memmingen-Lindau-Mindelheim 
147 Bank für Sozialwirtschaft 
148 LBS Ostdeutsche Landesbausparkasse 
149 Stadtsparkasse Mönchengladbach 
150 Sparkasse Chemnitz 
151 Sparda-Bank München 
152 Evangelische Kreditgenossenschaft 
153 Südwestbank 
154 Kreissparkasse Südholstein  
155 Sparkasse Aschaffenburg-Alzenau 
156 Kreissparkasse Ravensburg 
157 Sparkasse Gelsenkirchen 
158 Sparda-Bank Hannover 
159 Bankhaus Lampe 
160 Bankhaus Reuschel 
161 Sparkasse Harburg-Buxtehude 
162 Kreissparkasse Hildesheim 
163 Sparkasse Landshut 
164 Sparkasse Kiel 
165 Allgemeine Privatkundenbank 




168 Sparkasse Offenburg/Ortenau 
169 Sparkasse Bamberg 
170 Kreissparkasse Reutlingen 
171 National Bank 
172 Kreissparkasse Saarlouis 
173 BHW Bank 
174 Deutsche Bank Lübeck 
175 Sparkasse Leverkusen 
176 Sparkasse Fürth 
177 Sparkasse Paderborn 
178 Sparkasse Marburg-Biedenkopf 
179 Stadt- und Kreissparkasse Erlangen 
180 Sparkasse Regensburg 
181 Sparkasse Darmstadt 
182 Sparkasse Steinfurt 
183 Liga Bank 
184 Sparkasse Ingolstadt 
185 Sparkasse Göttingen 
186 Sparkasse Südliche Weinstraße 
187 Sparkasse Elbtal-Westlausitz 
188 AKB Privat-und Handelsbank 
189 PSA Finance Deutschland 
190 Sparkasse Ostholstein 
191 Sparkasse Trier 
192 Mainzer Volksbank 
193 Sparkasse Rhein-Nahe 
194 Kreissparkasse Borken 
195 Sparkasse Vogtland 
196 Sparda-Bank Nürnberg 
197 Sparkasse Stormarn 
198 Landes Bausparkasse Rheinland Pfalz 
199 Sparkasse Wetterau 
200 Sparkasse Recklinghausen 
201 Sparkasse Zollernalb 
202 Kreissparkasse Syke 
203 Sparkasse Kraichgau-Bruchsal-Bretten-Sinsheim 
204 Volksbank Paderborn-Höxter 
205 Wiesbadener Volksbank 
206 Kreissparkasse Calw 
207 Bank im Bistum Essen 
208 BHW Allgemeine Bausparkasse 
209 Sparkasse Mittelhaardt-Deutsche Weinstraße 
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210 Sparkasse Mülheim 
211 Sparkasse Fulda 
212 Bausparkasse Mainz 
213 Kreissparkasse Kaiserslautern 
214 Nord-Ostsee Sparkasse  
215 Sparkasse Lübeck 
216 Sparkasse Lüneburg 
217 Sparkasse Gifhorn-Wolfsburg 
218 Kreissparkasse Herzogtum Lauenburg 
219 Sparkasse Celle 
220 Sparkasse Lemgo 
221 Kreissparkasse Groß-Gerau 
222 Sparkasse Siegen 
223 Sparkasse Coesfeld 
224 Vereinigte Sparkasse Stadt und Landkreis Ansbach 
225 Kreissparkasse Augsburg 
226 Kreissparkasse Heinsberg 
227 Sparkasse Detmold 
228 Sparkasse Minden-Lübbecke 
229 Kreissparkasse Tuttlingen 
230 Volksbank Gießen  
231 Sparkasse Hagen 
232 Sparda-Bank Frankfurt (Main) 
233 Dortmunder Volksbank 
234 Stadtsparkasse Magdeburg 
235 Sparkasse Schaumburg 
236 Westfalenbank 
237 Vereinigte Volksbanken eG Böblingen-Calw-Sindel 
238 Kreissparkasse Düsseldorf 
239 Sparkasse Wetzlar 
240 Kreissparkasse Verden 
241 Sparkasse Roth-Schwabach 
242 Stadtsparkasse Oberhausen 
243 Flensburger Sparkasse 
244 Sparkasse Passau 
245 Falk Bank 
246 Volksbank Rhein-Neckar eG 
247 Sparkasse Rosenheim 
248 Allianz Bausparkasse 
249 Sparkasse Bayreuth 
250 Volksbank in Stuttgart AG 
251 Sparda-Bank Hamburg 
252 Kreissparkasse Segeberg 
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253 Sparkasse Villingen-Schwenningen 
254 AKA Ausfuhrkreditanstalt 
255 Sparkasse Dieburg 
256 Volksbank Bonn-Rhein-Sieg 
257 Sparkasse im Landkreis Schwandorf 
258 Landesbausparkasse Schleswig-Holstein 
259 Stadt und Kreissparkasse Hof 
260 Kreissparkasse Wesermünde-Hadeln 
261 Berenberg Bank - Joh. Berenberg, Gossler & Co. 
262 Stadtsparkasse Solingen 
263 Volksbank Pforzheim 
264 Sparkasse Neumarkt 
265 Sparda-Bank Essen 
266 Städtische Sparkasse Bremerhaven 
267 Sparkasse Hochrhein 
268 Sparkasse Worms 
269 Sparkasse Miltenberg-Obernburg 
270 Westerwald Bank  
271 Sparda-Bank Köln 
272 Kreissparkasse Bad Tölz-Wolfratshausen 
273 Sparkasse Neu-Ulm lllertissen 
274 Sparkasse Amberg-Sulzbach 
275 Sparkasse Nienburg 
276 Kreissparkasse Euskirchen 
277 Sparkasse Neckartal-Odenwald 
278 Sparkasse Moers 
279 Sparkasse Gütersloh 
280 Sparkasse Neuwied 
281 Volksbank Hannover 
282 Ulmer Volksbank 
283 Sparkasse Stade-Altesland  
284 Volksbank Freiburg 
285 Sparkasse Rotenburg-Bremervoerde 
286 Volksbank Göppingen 
287 Sparkasse Starkenburg 





Descriptive Satistics of Al Vriables from 1998 - 200217 
 ROA ROE CONC MS Portfolio 
Risk 
Capital Risk 
 Mean 0.2395 5.6827 0.0378 0.0035 0.0988 4.3384 
 Median 0.2200 5.4200 0.0360 0.0006 0.0404 4.0900 
 Maximum 2.7000 81.5300 0.0428 0.1309 2.7062 83.3400 
 Minimum -0.5000 -110.0400 0.0355 0.0001 0.0000 0.0081 
 Std. Dev. 0.2116 7.4201 0.0029 0.0109 0.2064 5.3952 
 Skewness 4.5742 -5.0515 1.0355 6.7618 5.5260 11.3916 
 Kurtosis 43.5831 115.1510 2.3042 58.1997 44.5330 157.5438 
 Jarque-Bera 77808.7300 602824.000 226.9251 53554.9 82813.50 1160153 
 Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Observations 1345 1393 1393 1393 1327 1393 
 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 P1 P2 
 Mean 10811.1900 4899.1080 4899.1080 4716.7940 0.0397 0.0174 
 Median 1961.2000 331.6000 331.6000 741.9000 0.0372 0.0193 
 Maximum 419300 120259.0 120259.0 415100.0 0.2055 0.0871 
 Minimum 312.5000 1.00E-06 1.00E-06 1.00E-06 0.0012 3.63E-05 
 Std. Dev. 34261.1900 16153.8700 16153.8700 20868.7600 0.0140 0.0084 
 Skewness 6.8475 4.8285 4.8286 13.1717 5.9600 0.3257 
 Kurtosis 60.5655 27.9954 27.9954 232.3926 61.9586 7.5356 
 Jarque-Bera 166459.400 34136.2700 34136.27 2534680 172015.6 998.23 
 Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Observations 1393 1393 1393 1393 1393 1393 
 
 P3 B 
 Mean 0.2949 106.2340 
 Median 0.0647 43.0000 
 Maximum 22.2000 14726.0000 
 Minimum 0.0018 1.0000 
 Std. Dev. 1.4202 734.8709 
 Skewness 10.4646 18.5515 
 Kurtosis 128.8952 355.7600 
 Jarque-Bera 774341.700 5981513 
 Probability  0.0000  0.0000 
 Observations 1393 1393 
                                                 
17
 Skewness is a measure of asymmetry of the distribution of the series around its mean. Positive skewness 
means that the distribution has a long right tail and negative skewness implies that the distribution has a long 
left tail. 
 Kurtosis measures the peakedness or flatness of the distribution of the series. The kurtosis of the normal dis-
tribution is 3. If the kurtosis exceeds 3, the distribution is peaked relative to the normal; if the kurtosis is less 
than 3, the distribution is flat relative to the normal. 
 Jarque-Bera is a test statistic for testing whether the series is normally distributed. Under the null hypothesis 
of a normal distribution, the Jarque-Bera statistic is distributed as χ2 with 2 degrees of freedom. 
 The reported probability is the probability that a Jarque-Bera statistic exceeds the observed value under the 




Empirical Results of the Profit-Structure Relationship without Considering the Portfolio 
Risk 
Variable ROE (eq. 6) CONC (eq. 7) MS (eq. 8) 





Concentration Rte  56.9392 (106.8981)   



















Adjusted R2 3.56% 1.3% 7.43% 
Approximate standard error in parentheses; 
* significantly different from zero at 10% level; 
** significantly different from zero at 5% level; 
*** significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
In Appendix 3, our result indicates that the Relative-Market-Power Hypothesis is rejected as 
an explanation of the profit-structure relationship in the German banking market. The Struc-
ture-Conduct-Performance Hypothesis does not contribute to illuminating the profit-structure 
relationship. The Scale-Efficiency version of Efficient-Structure Hypothesis is accepted since 
the coefficients of scale efficiency are positive and significant in three equations. However, 
the adjusted R2 of the equation are very low.  
 
